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IN MASSACHUSETTS? * 

THOMAS H. SEYMOUR** 
Employers are generally liable for their employees' torts, 
under respondeat superior principles, if those torts occur within the 
employees' "scope of employment."! Until quite recently, Massa­
chusetts courts applied, with relative consistency, a three-part test 
for scope of employment developed by the Supreme Judicial Court 
("SJC") in Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc. 2 
With Clickner v. City of Lowell,3 however, the SJC may have sig­
naled a desire to turn away from Wang's approach to scope of em­
ployment and to restrict employer liability for employee torts 
noticeably more than it has in the past. What is troubling about 
Clickner is that the outcome reached in the case resulted from 
questionable reasoning; moreover, the court seemed unaware that 
it had significantly departed from Wang's straight-forward scope of 
employment test or· the implications of that departure. Thus, 
Clickner may have confused more· than clarified Massachusetts 
scope of employment law . 
. The first part of this Article analyzes the three elements of the 
scope of employment test articulated in Wang. The second part dis­
cusses the Clickner case and explores the potential ramifications of 
that decision for scope of employment jurisprudence In 
Massachusetts. 
* Copyright © 1997 by Thomas H. Seymour. All rights reserved. 
** Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
B.A., University of Nebraska; M.A., Simon Fraser University; J.D., Harvard. Many 
thanks go to the students in my legal practice courses at Suffolk University Law School 
and Michigan Law School, who helped me immeasurably to sharpen my understanding 
of Massachusetts scope of employment law. 
1. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) ("A master is sub­
ject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their 
employment."). 
2. 501 N.E.2d 1163 (Mass. 1986). 
3. 663 N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1996). 
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I. THE WANG SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT TEST 
In 1977, Wang contracted with Dudley L. Post (whose business 
was later named Business Incentive, Inc.) to help Wang find ways to 
save on its taxes.4 Post's compensation was to be a third of any 
savings.5 Over the course of three years Post saved Wang hundreds 
of thousands of dollars in taxes.6 A year or so after contracting 
with Post, Wang hired Lawrence Joseph as its "one-person tax de­
partment."7 Joseph began to supervise Post's activities, and at one 
point Joseph circulated a memorandum to his supervisors, stating 
that "Post's services could be performed in-house, and that Post's 
fees could be eliminated."8 When Wang was unable to buyout 
Post's contract, the company terminated it and sued Post for alleged 
violations of the contract.9 Post counter-sued Wang for the unpaid 
fees owed him.lO Wang argued that it could not be held liable be­
cause "Joseph's conduct leading to the termination of Post's con­
tract was not the kind of conduct he was employed to perform."ll 
Wang noted that "Joseph was not directed by anyone at Wang to 
review Post's work under the contract but [Joseph] just sort of 
moved out and ... got involved on his own."12 
To decide the question of Wang's liability, the SJC needed to 
determine whether Joseph's conduct was within his scope of em­
ploymentP The court established in Wang that an employee's con­
duct is within "the scope of [his] employment [1] if it is of the kind 
he is employed to perform; [2] if it occurs substantially within the 
authorized time and space limits [of his employment]; and [3] if it is 
motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer."14 
An employee's conduct must pass all three parts of the Wang testto 
be within his or her scope of employment.15 
Joseph's activities as a "junior manager" at Wang and as 
4. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (Mass. 
1986). 
5. See id. 
6. See id. at 1164-65. 
7. Id. at 1164. 
8. Id. at 1164-65. 
9. Id. at 1165. 
10. See id. at 1164. 
11. Id. at 1167. 
12. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the 
superior court judge's findings). 
13. See id. at 1166. 
14. Id. (citations omitted). 
15. See id. 
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Wang's "in-house" tax consultant,16 the SJC decided, were clearly 
"the kind of conduct he was employed to perform and that [con­
duct] occurred within the authorized limits of time and space."17 
The only remaining question concerned Joseph's motives. The SJC 
acknowledged that "Joseph's 'alliance with Post was broken with an 
intent to advance [Joseph's] own interests within the corpora­
tion."'18 Nevertheless, because Joseph was attempting "to obtain 
the benefits of Post's contract for Wang without cost," Joseph had 
acted, in part, "with an intent to serve Wang."19 Wang was thus 
"legally responsible for the losses incurred by Post," as Joseph's 
conduct passed all three part of the Wang test for scope of 
employment.2o 
Since Wang, this three-part test has dominated scope of em­
ployment law in Massachusetts. Not all three factors are in dispute 
in every lawsuit, of course. Nearly all post-Wang courts, however, 
have used the Wang test to shape their scope of employment analy­
ses.21 As well, both pre- and post-Wang courts agree that "[t]he 
scope of [an employee's employment should] not [be] construed re­
strictively in [Massachusetts]."22 
A. The "Job" test 
The first part of the Wang test asks whether the employee was 
doing his or her job, doing what he or she was hired to doP Some­
16. Id. at 1164. 
17. Id. at 1167. No mention was made of Joseph's actual location during the time 
that he was working to end Post's relationship with Wang. For a discussion of the "time 
and space" test as applied in Wang, see infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
18. Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1167 (quoting the superior court judge's findings). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. See, e.g., 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust v. Capitol Bank and Trust Co. (In 
re 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust), 119 B.R. 350 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (applying 
Massachusetts scope of employment law), affd, 968 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1992); Burroughs 
v. Commonwealth, 673 N.E.2d 1217 (Mass. 1996); Clickner v. City of Lowell, 663 
N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1996); Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1996); 
Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958 (Mass. 1990); Pinshaw 
v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351 (Mass. 1988); Howard v. Town of Bur­
lington, 506 N.E.2d 102 (Mass. 1987); Kelly v. Middlesex Corp., 616 N.E.2d 473 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1993); International Bhd. of Police Officers, Local 433 v. Memorial Press, Inc., 
575 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). 
22. Commonwealth v. Jerez, 457 N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (Mass. 1983) (citing Pridgen 
v. Boston Hous. Auth., 308 N.E.2d 467 (Mass. 1974»; see also Howard, 506 N.E.2d at 
105 (citing Jerez, 547 N.E.2d at 1108); Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855 (quoting Howard, 
506 N.E.2d at 105). 
23. See Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166. 
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times this question is ,easy for the court to determine; sometimes 
not. Blue-collar jobs, which have readily discernible boundaries, 
are particularly easy. For example, in.Kelly v. Middlesex Corpora­
tion,24 the employee in question, Sergio Peluffo, was apparently a 
construction worker.25 Peluffo became involved in an auto accident 
while driving from his home to his job site to pick up his 
paycheck.26 The accident victim sued both Peluffo and his em­
ployer, Middlesex Corporation.27 The appeals court, noting that 
Peluffo had not been told to pick up his check, nor was he being 
paid to do so, determined that Peluffo was not, engaged in the work 
he was employed to perform at the time of his accident.28 There­
fore, the appeals court reversed the trial court's judgment against 
Middlesex Corporation.29 
Similarly, in International Brotherhood of Polir:;e Officers" Lo­
cal 433 v. Memorial Press, Inc. ,30 the appeals court decided that an 
employee at Memorial Press, who intentionally altered an adver­
tisement in a newspaper, was doing what he or she was hired to 
do.31 In one sense, of course, the employee obviously, was not do­
ing his or her job; surreptitiously altering ad copy is hardly what 
newspapers employ people to do. If, however, courts determined 
the "job" requirement by assessing whether employees were doing 
their jobs properly, then employers would never be held vicariously 
liable for the actions of their employees, since no one is ever em­
ployed to do his or her job improperly, let alone to commit torts. 
The question, rather, is whether the employee was doing his or her 
24. 616 N.E.2d 473 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). 
25. It was never revealed exactly what work Peluffo did. The court reported only 
that Peluffo worked at a job site that Middlesex's job superintendent shut down when it 
began to rain and sent his men home. See id. at 474, 475. 
26. See id. at 475. Peluffo's supervisor had given Peluffo the option of Collecting 
his paycheck when he arrived at work the following Monday, or of driving to the shut­
down job site on Friday to collect it. See id. at 474. J>eluffo chose the latter option. See 
~ , 
27. See id. 
28. See id. 475-76. 
29. See id. at 474. 
30. 575 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). 
31. See id. at 377-78. While collective bargaining was going on between the Plym­
outh Police Department and the town, one of the town's selectmen criticized the police­
men for spending too much time at a doughnut shop. See id. In response, the police 
union placed an ad with the Old Colony Memorial, published by Memorial Press, the 
headline of which read: '''Plymouth Police Department Is Undermanned:'" Id. at 378. 
When the ad appeared in the newspaper, "the second 'e' in the word 'Department' 
looked like a doughnut." Id. The police union sued Memorial Press "for libel, deceit, 
negligence, breach of contract, and violation of [Mass. Gen. Laws ch.] 93A." Id. 
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job at all. In Memorial Press, therefore, the intentional misprint 
passed the first element of the Wang test because the unknown em­
ployee was, after all, helping to print the newspaper, and "the alter­ 0 
ation of the advertisement occurred in the regular course of 
production . .0. ."32 
White-collar employment, however, is not so easily delineated. 
Because of this, and because of the general belief that an em­
ployee's scope of employment should not be construed restric­
tively33 to determine whether an employee's questioned conduct 
was "of the kind he was employed to perform,"34 courts often look 
less at that person's "formally described" duties and more at his or 
her "actual and customary" ones.35 
In Howard v. Town of Burlington, for example, the chairwo­
man of Burlington's finance committee; Paula Davis, was an em­
ployee without formally described duties.36 A group of taxpayers 
sought to enjoin the town from indemnifying Davis in a defamation 
action brought against her for statements she apparently made dur­
ing a meeting with Burlington's chief administrative officer, Robert 
Mercie'r, concerning whether the town should purchase a new am­
32. Id. at 378. Ultimately, Memorial Press was held not to be liable for the un­
known employee's intentional misprint because the appeals court decided that the em­
ployee's reasons for altering the ad were purely personal; thus his or her conduct failed 
the "motive" test, the third part of the Wang test. See id. at 378-79. For a discussion of 
Wang's "motive" test, see infra Part I.C. 
The difference between an employee intentionally doing a job badly and not doing 
. it at all potentially makes all the difference in whether the employer is liable or not. 
One would therefore expect courts to agonize a little over what distinguishes work pur­
posefully done incorrectly from conduct that is not work in the first place. But they 
evidently do not. In 604 Columbus Avenue Realty Trust v. Capitol Bank and Trust Co. 
(In re 604 Columbia Avenue Realty Trust), 119 B.R. 350 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990), affd, 
968 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1992), for example, the court decided that a bank employee who 
agreed to recommend a loan agreement to his Executive Committee only after he had 
negotiated a kickback for himself was doing what he was employed to do. See id. at 
355-57,371. This bank employee was performing the kind of work he was employed to 
perform, the court said, because his duties "included deciding whether loans should be 
approved and on what terms. .. and negotiating loan agreements ...." Id. at 371. It 
was apparently irrelevant to the court that one of those terms was clearly tortious and 
would surely have been unacceptable to the bank, had it known of it. Perhaps judges 
recognize the difference between "job" and "not job" when they see it, but are unable 
to define it. 
00 • 0 33. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
.' 0 . 3!4. Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1166 (Mass. 
01986) (citation omitted). 
35. Howard v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 102, 105-06 (Mass. 1987) (citing 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. a (1958». 
36. See id. at 106. 
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bulance.37 "Davis did not meet with Mercier at the request or or­
der of the finance committee, and no other members of the 
committee were present. "38 
After a bench trial, a superior court judge enjoined the town 
from indemnifying Davis because "when 'she walked into Mercier's 
office she left her official identity behind.'''39 The SJC reversed, 
finding "no direct evidence to support the conclusion that Davis 
met with Mercier as a private citizen and not as a committee chair­
woman."40 On the contrary, the court said, the responsibilities of 
the town's finance committee were "broad," and discussing whether 
Burlington needed a new ambulance was "certainly a subject within 
the official concern of the committee and its chairwoman."41 Con­
versing with other town officials about town problems, in other 
words, was the kind of work Davis was employed to perform be­
cause it was the sort of thing she did and because she was not pre­
cluded from doing it.42 Put this way, the court's reasoning sounds 
circular. However, for many employees, such as Davis, there is no 
credible way to determine what their job is other than to look at 
what they ordinarily do. 
The SJC dealt with a similarly ill-defined employment situation 
in Wang itself.43 Wang argued that its employee; Lawrence Joseph, 
had not been directed to review the performance of an outside con­
sultant, Dudley Post; rather, Joseph "just sort of moved out and ... 
got involved on his own."44 The SJC, however, confirmed the trial 
court's determination that Joseph was indeed doing what Wang had 
hired him to do.45 Joseph, "a junior manager [employed] to con­
duct [Wang's] in-house tax affairs,"46 was in general doing what he 
was hired to do when he began to supervise Post, and when he fig­
ured out a way for Wang to avoid paying Post many thousands of 
dollars each year.47 Of perhaps even greater importance to the 
court was that "Joseph's appraisals of Post's services and his in­
37. See id. at 103-04. 
38. Id. at 104. 
39. Id. (quoting the superior court judge's opinion). 
40. Id. at 105. 
41. Id. at 104-05. 
42. See id. at 106. 
43. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (Mass. 
1986). 
44. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the 
superior court judge's findings). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 1164. 
47. See id. at 1165. 
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volvement with Post's contract were repeatedly endorsed and uti­
lized by Wang's executives. "48 An employer implicitly signals, 
therefore, that an employee is doing what he or she was hired to do 
when the employer "uses" or "endorses" an employee's conduct. 
The limits of an employee's employment thus can expand (or pre­
sumably contract) depending on the employer's response to the em­
ployee's actions. 
Both Howard's "actual and customary" and Wang's "endorsed 
and utilized" approaches to Wang's test were employed by the SJC 
in Pinshaw v. Metropolitan District Commission.49 After a verbal 
altercation with Frederick Monk, a Metropolitan District Commis­
sion ("MDC") policeman, Alan Pinshaw, complained to Monk's su­
pervisors.50 When Monk was notified of Pinshaw's civilian 
complaint, he sought and obtained a criminal complaint against Pin­
shaw "for failing to comply with an order to move his car on re­
quest of an MDC officer ...."51 The complaint against Pinshaw 
was dismissed, and Pinshaw subsequently won a civil rights suit 
against Monk in federal court.52 Pinshaw then filed an action in the 
superior court to force the MDC and the commonwealth to indem­
nify Monk.53 
At trial the superior court judge granted the defendant's mo­
tion for summary judgment, concluding that Monk's prosecution of 
the criminal complaint against Pinshaw was part of Monk's" 'pri­
vate counter-attack or personal vendetta'" against Pinshaw and not 
within the scope of Monk's employment.54 On appeal the SJC re­
versed.55 The court determined that Monk's conduct, even though 
it resulted in a successful civil rights action against him, was of the 
kind he was employed to perform because "[p]rosecution of crimi­
nal complaints for violations of MDe regulations [was] part of 
Monk's job. [And t]he fact that Monk's superiors knew of the re­
taliatory action is some evidence that they may have endorsed or 
48. [d. Similar language appears in Pinshaw v. Metropolitan District Commission, 
524 N.E.2d 1351 (Mass. 1988), where the SJC thought that the employer's awareness of 
the employee's tortious conduct was "some evidence that [the employer] may have en­
dorsed or ratified [the employee's] action." [d. at 1357. 
49. 524 N.E.2d at 1357. 
50. See id. at 1353. 
51. [d. 
52. See id. at 1353-54. 
53. See id. at 1354. 
54. [d. at 1356-57 (quoting the superior court judge's decision). 
55. See id. at 1353. 
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ratified Monk's action."56 
That Monk performed his job badly, even deliberately so, did 
not phase the SJC, just as the court of appeals was not phased by 
the employee's intentional misprint of an ad in Memorial Press.57 
Because courts liberally interpret "scope of employment,"58 an em­
ployee is doing what he or she has been hired to do, even if he or 
she is doing it miserably, as long as the employee's conduct is of the 
general type that he or she usually does, or the employer knows 
what the employee is doing and fails to object.59 Only if an em­
ployee does something that he or she clearly was not directed or 
paid to dO,60 or that is completely inconsistent with the employer's 
general practices or policies,61 will that conduct fail Wang's "job" 
test and fall outside the employee's scope of employment, relieving 
the employer of liability. 
B. The "Time and Space" Test 
In addition to passing the "job" test, an employee's conduct is 
not within his or her scope of employment unless it also "occurs 
substantially within the authorized time and space limits" of his or 
her employment.62 This second element of the Wang test appar­
ently intends to strike a balance between two competing concerns. 
On the one hand, if employers are not in a position to supervise and 
control their employees, they should not be liable for their employ­
ees' torts. This explains why an employee's conduct falls within his 
Or her scope of employment only if it occurs within the authorized 
time and space limits of the job.63 On the other hand, courts gener­
ally choose not to interpret. scope of employment restrictively.64 
56. Id. at 1357. 
57. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
58. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
59. See, e.g., Pinshaw, 524 N.E.2d at 1357; Howard v. Town of Burlington, 506 
N.E.2d 102, 105-06 (Mass. 1987); Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 
N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (Mass. 1986). 
60. See, e.g., Kelly v. Middlesex Corp., 616 N.E.2d 473, 475-76 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1993). 
61. See, e.g., Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 815, 818, 820 (Mass. 1996) 
(finding that an assistant store manager's alleged sexual assault and rape of a store 
employee was not "the kind of action that Purity Supreme employed him to perform"); 
Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958, 967 (Mass. 1990) 
(finding that day-care center employees' alleged sexual assault of children in their care 
was not what they were employed to do). 
62. Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166. 
63. See id. 
64. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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Defining the time and space limits of an employee's job too literally 
or too rigidly would defeat that goal. This explains why, to fall 
within an employee's scope of ~mployment, his or her conduct must 
occur only substantia~ly within the authorized time and space limits 
of that employment.65 
As is true of the first element of the Wang test, the second 
element is sometimes easy to determine and sometimes more diffi­
cult. As a general rule, it seems easier for courts to determine what 
the "authorized time and space limits" are for blue-collar employ­
ees than for white-collar employees. Sergio Peluffo, the construc­
tion worker in Kelly who was involved in an auto accident as he 
drove from his home to his closed-down "job site" to pick up his 
paycheck, is a clear example.66 . Peluffo's employer had not in­
structed him to pick up his paycheck.67 So his "travel[ing] between 
[his] place of residence and place of business [was not] a mission to 
further the purposes of [his] employer."68 Thus, the appeals court 
concluded that the highway where the accident occurred was not 
within the authorized space limits of Peluffo's employment.69 In 
Memorial Press, the unknown employee's conduct took place "sub­
stantially within the authorized time and space limits"70 of his or 
her employment because the intentional misprint of a newspaper ad 
copy "occurred in the regular course of the production of the news­
paper ...."71 These two cases concern employees with well-de­
fined work areas and hours, making it apparently easy for the 
courts to determine whether the employees' conduCt fell "substan~ 
tially" within or without the time and space limits of their 
employment. ­
A policeman's job, on the other hand, has much less clearly 
defined time and space limits. Twice since the Wang decision, the 
SJC has had to determine whether. a policeman's tortious conduct 
occurred within the scope of employment.72 In Pinshaw the answer 
65. See Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166. 
66. See Kelly v. Middlesex Corporation; 616 N.E.2d 473, 474 (Mass. ~pp. Ct. 
1993). 
67. See id. at 475.' 

. 68. Id. 

69. See id. at 475-76. 
70. International Bhd. of Police Officers v. Memorial Press, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 376, 
'378 (Mass~ App. Ct. 1991). . 
71. Id. 
72. See Clickner v. City of Lowell, 663 N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1996); Pinshaw v. Met­
ropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351 (Mass. 1988). 
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was probably yes,73 in Clickner, the answer was certainly no.74 
In the course of committing the tort at issue, Frederick Monk, 
the MDC policeman in Pinshaw, had directed traffic near Fenway 
Park,75 sought and obtained a criminal complaint against the plain­
tiff in Roxbury District Court,76 and acted as police prosecutor at 
the plaintiff's trial.77 The SJC believed that whenever and wherever 
Monk engaged in these activities, he was so obviously within the 
time and space limits of his employment that the court did not even 
need to address the issue.78 On the other hand, Francis M. Water­
man, the Lowell policeman in Clickner, was not within the time and 
space limits of his employment when, while driving to his scheduled 
shift in Lowell, he tried to respond to an emergency call and drove 
his automobile across the center line of the road in Groton, hitting 
the car in which the Clickners were riding.79 The SJC noted that at 
the time of the accident, Waterman "was neither on duty, nor in a 
place helpful to his employer."8o 
What distinguishes Pinshaw from Clickner is that Monk was at 
all times "in a place helpful to his employer," while Waterman, ac­
cording to the SJC, was not.81 This approach taken by the SJC in 
determining the "time and space" issue reveals how interconnected 
the superficially distinct elements of the Wang test can be, and fre­
quently are. To be in a place "helpful'" to one's employer is, 
phrased differently, to be in a position to do what one has been 
73. See Pinshaw, 524 N.E.2d at 1356. 
74. See Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 856. 
75. See Pinshaw, 524 N.E.2d at 1353. 
76. See id. 
77. See id. at 1353 n.3. 
78. See id. at 1356. The court declared that "Monk's conduct clearly was of the 
kind he was hired to perform," satisfying Wang's "job" test. Id. Then, ignoring the 
time and space limits of Monk's employment, the court immediately turned to address 
the only issue that it found to be in contention, Monk's motivation for his conduct-the 
third element of the Wang test. See id. at 1356-57. The SIC concluded that the trial 
court judge had erred in ruling that Monk could not reasonably "have believed he was 
serving his employer in prosecuting the plaintiff ...." See id. 
79. See Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 854. 
80. Id. at 855. The appeals court in Kelly did not use the "in a place helpful to his 
employer" analysis in discussing why Sergio Peluffo was not within the time and space 
limits of his employment as he drove to his job site to pick up his paycheck. See Kelly v. 
Middlesex Corp., 616 N.E.2d 473, 475-76 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). This phrase from 
Clickner, however, helps illuminate the "coming and going" rule that the Kelly court 
applied, under which employees traveling to or from work are almost never within the 
scope of their employment. Id. at 474-75. 
81. For a more detailed analysis of Clickner, including a discussion of whether 
Waterman was in fact "in a place helpful to his employer" at the time of his auto acci­
dent, see infra Parts II.A. and II.B. 
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employed to do. Monk was doing what he was employed to do, so 
wherever he was doing it, he was in a "place helpful to his em­
ployer." Thus Monk's conduct passed Wang's "time and space" test 
because it passed the "job" test.82 Waterman, on the other hand, 
was not in a "place helpful to his employer,"83 which is in large part 
why his conduct was found not to be of "'the kind of work which he 
was employed to perform."'84 Thus, Waterman's conduct failed 
Wang's "job" test mainly because it failed the "time and space" test. 
The first element of the Wang test is, as well, frequently intertwined 
with the third element, motive, but not nearly to the extent that the 
first and second elements are.85 
With the limited exception of Worcester Insurance Co. v. Fells 
Acres Day School, Inc. ,86 in every case since Wang, the court has 
determined that the employee's conduct either passed both the first 
and second parts of the Wang test, or failed both parts. The reason 
for this result is most evident in those cases involving white-collar 
employees. Such employees may have offices (although even that 
is not always the case), but spend little time in them. Their work 
days are vaguely defined, if at all. These employees rarely work 
shifts and never punch time clocks. White-collar employees work 
when and where they have to do the kind of work they are em­
ployed to perform. For example, in 604 Columbus Avenue Realty 
Trust v. Capitol Bank and Trust Co. (In re 604 Columbus Avenue 
Realty Trust),87 a bank employee, Sidney Weiner, helped negotiate 
a loan with the plaintiffs and agreed to recommend it to the bank 
for which he worked, but only if he received a kickback.88 In find­
ing that Weiner's conduct was within his scope of employment, the 
82. See supra note 78 and accompanying text for analysis of this point. 
83. Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855. This was so even though he was driving a Low­
ell-owned vehicle at the time of his accident. See id. at 864. Being in (or on) the em­
ployer's property apparently is not enough to place the employee substantially within 
the authorized space limits of his or her employment. 
84. [d. at 856 (quoting superior court judge's decision). 
85. For a discussion of Wang's "motive" test, in general, and its relation to the 
"job" test, in particular, see infra Part I.C.3. 
86. 558 N.E.2d 958 (Mass. 1990). 
The only factor even arguably supporting the tort plaintiffs' claims under this 
theory [of the employer's vicarious liability] is that some of the abuse [of the 
children in the care of the day-care center] is alleged to have occurred "within 
the authorized time and space limits[,)" ... i.e., at the school during school 
hours. Because some of the abuse is alleged to have been committed off the 
school grounds, even this factor does not support the plaintiffs. 
[d. at 967 (citation omitted). 
87. 119 B.R. 350 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990), affd, 968 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1992). 
88. See id. at 355-57. 
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court said nothing specific about when or where any of Weiner's 
actions had taken place, but observed that they had all "occurred 
substantially within the flexible time and space limits in which the 
Bank permitted him to conduct its business."89 
It is precisely this flexibility in a white-collar employee's "au­
thorized time and space limits" that makes it nearly impossible for a 
court to determine whether such an employee's conduct passes 
Wang's "time and space" test, except by deciding whether it passes 
the "job" test. Thus, in Wang itself, the SJC discussed at length the 
kinds of things the employee, Lawrence Joseph, had done and 
whether they were of the sort he had been employed to perform.90 
Nowhere in the opinion, however, does the court mention where 
Joseph was when he undertook' his tortious actiVities, or when he 
undertook them. The only comment the court made about Joseph's 
conduct in relation to element two of its own test was the simple, 
conc1usory statement: "[I]t occurred within the authorized limits of 
time and space."91 The court apparently assumed that what Joseph 
did, he did at his office at Wang (assuming he had one), or the court 
did not care. That Joseph, Wang's "one-man tax department," was 
doing tax-related work eVidently "proved" that he was where Wang 
"authorized" him to be, when they "authorized" him to be there. 
Likewise, in Howard, the SJC discussed at length the em­
ployee's questionable conduct and whether it was of the sort she 
was employed to perform.92 The employee, Paula DaVis, the town's 
finance committee chairwoman, conversed with another town offi­
cial, Robert Mercier, in his office about the town~s need for a new 
ambulance.93 Whether being in Mercier's office instead of in .her 
own (or in the finarice committee's meeting room) might have 
pushed DaVis outside the scope of her employment either did not 
occur to the court or it did not matter.94 D'aVis was doing what she 
was employed to do.95 As the court noted, an employee "'is au­
thorized to do anything which is reasonably regarded as incidental 
89. Id. at 371. 
90. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1164-65, 
1167 (Mass. 1986). 
91. Id. at 1167. 
92. See Howard v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 102 passim (Mass. 1986). 
93. See id. at 104. 
94. 'Although the Howard court acknowledged Wang's importance in establishing 
the standards for scope of employment, see id. at 105, it did not specifically apply 
Wang's three-part test to the facts in Howard. In a less formulaic way, however, it 
considered the same scope of employment factors that the Wang court did. 
95. See id. at 106. 
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to the work specifically directed or which is usually done in connec­
tion with such work. "'96 It was evidently "incidental" to her work 
for Davis, a town official, to go to another town official's office in 
order to discuss official town business. 
Cases like Pinshaw, In re 604 Columbus Avenue Realty Trust, 
Wang, and Howard show that courts have difficulty keeping sepa­
rate the first two elements of the Wang· test. They also show as well 
the relative unimportance-even redundancy-of the second ele­
ment, the "time and space" requirement. Part two of the test often 
collapses back into part one. Rarely is there an independent way 
for a court to determine whether an employee's conduct falls within 
the time and space limits of his or her employment. Rather, courts 
typically answer the "time and space" question the same way they 
frame and answer the "job" question .. 
C. The "Motive" Test 
Finally, in addition to passing Wang's "job" and "time and 
space" tests, an employee's conduct must also pass the "motive" 
test in order to fall within that employee's scope of employment.97 
This third part of the Wang test determines whether the employee's 
conduct was "motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the 
employer."98 This purpose, however, need only be minimal. "The 
fact that the predominant motive of the [employee] is to benefit 
himself does not prevent the act from coming within the scope of 
employment ...."99 Perhaps Pinshaw demonstrates most graphi­
cally how little the employee's conduct can be motivated "by a pur­
pose to serve the employer" and still pass the third part of the 
Wang test.loo At trial the superior court judge entered summary 
judgment for the defendant,101 finding that the MOC police officer 
had prosecuted a criminal complaint against the plaintiff as "'a pri­
vate counter-attack or personal vendetta' against the plaintiff 
...."102 The criminal complaint was dismissed, and Pinshaw subse­
quently successfully sued Monk for violating his civil rights.103 Nev­
96. [d. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. a (1958». 
97. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1166 (Mass. 
1986). 
98. !d. (citation omitted). For a discussion of the "motive" test as applied in 
Wang, see infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text. 
99. Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
100. Pinshaw v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351 (Mass. 1988). 
101. See id. at 1353. . 
102. [d. at 1357 (quoting the superior court judge's decision). 
103. See id. at 1353, 1354. 
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ertheless, the SJC opined, "[e]ven if Monk was motivated by a 
degree of vindictiveness, he also may have believed he was serving 
his employer in prosecuting the plaintiff ...."104 Thus, over a vig­
orous dissent,10S the court ruled that the MDC was not entitled to 
summary judgment, since it was not certain that Monk's motives 
were entirely personal.106 Only if an employee's motives are 
"purely personal," and his or her actions "in no way connected with 
the employer's interests," will the employee's conduct fall outside 
the scope of employment.107 
The decision in Wang and In re 604 Columbus Avenue Realty 
Trust,lOS provide additional examples of employees whose predomi­
nant motives were to serve themselves not their employers, yet 
whose conduct still passed Wang's "motive" test. In Wang, when he 
was hired as a "one-man tax department," Lawrence Joseph began 
to work with and supervise Wang's outside tax consultant, Dudley 
L. POSt.109 In his four years with Wang, Post generated nearly 
$1,400,000 in tax savings for the company.110 Nevertheless, Joseph 
sent a memorandum to his supervisors criticizing Post's works, in­
sinuating that Post was not saving Wang as much money as he 
could, and suggesting that "Post's services could be performed in­
house ...."111 The SJC found that Joseph's assertions were" 'not 
advanced in good faith"'; rather, "'his alliance with Post was broken 
with an intent to advance his own interests within the corpora­
tion."'112 Joseph's conduct, which "was akin to the tort of inten­
tional interference with contractual relations,"113 led Wang to 
terminate Post's contract.114 Since Post's contract called for him to 
be paid a third of the tax savings he generated for Wang,l1S bringing 
his tax work in house-where a salaried employee (presumably Jo­
seph) would do it-would clearly save Wang money. The court had 
104. Id. at 1357 (emphasis added). 
105. See id. at 1360-61 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
106. See id. at 1357. 
107. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
108. 119 B.R. 350 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990), affd, 968 F.2d 1332 (1st Cir. 1992). 
109. See Wang Lab., Inc., v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 
(Mass. 1986). 
110. See id. at 1164-65. 
111. Id. at 1165. 
112. Id. (quoting the superior court judge's findings). 
113. Kansallis Fin. Ltd. v. Fern, 659 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Mass. 1996) (characterizing 
"the harm complained of in Wang"). 
114. See Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1165. 
115. See id. at 1164. 
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no doubt that "Joseph was motivated by self-interest ...."116 Still, 
Wang might have benefited from Joseph's actions. That he as­
sumed his scheme would have saved the corporation some money 
showed that Joseph "acted with an intent to serve Wang."117 Jo­
seph's motives, though "predominately" personal, were not com­
pletely so; therefore, Wang became liable for his tortious 
conduct.118 
In In re 604 Columbus Avenue Realty Trust,119 Sidney Weaver, 
the Capitol Bank employee who agreed to recommend that the 
plaintiff receive a loan from the bank only after he had "negoti­
ated" a kickback for himself,120 appears, like Officer Monk in Pin­
shaw, to have been driven by purely personal motives. The 
Bankruptcy Court decided otherwise, because Weiner's kickback 
plan would have taken money out of the plaintiff's pocket, not the 
bank's.121 The court implicitly acknowledged that Weiner's pre­
dominant motive was to benefit himself, but stated that it did" 'not 
prevent the act from coming within [Weiner's] scope of employ­
ment ...."'122 The court noted that "by advancing loan proceeds to 
fund kickbacks, Weiner was not only helping himself but was also 
helping the Bank earn interest and other substantial fees, all with 
little risk ...."123 Thus, Capitol Bank was liable for Weiner's 
conversion.124 
Neither the SJC in Wang nor the bankruptcy court in In re 604 
Columbus Avenue Realty Trust considered the long-term value of 
the employees' conduct. If they had, they might have come to a 
different conclusion about the "benefits" the employers received. 
Wang's "motive" test, however, does not attempt to determine 
whether the employer profited by the employee's conduct, only 
whether a modicum of the employee's purpose was "to serve the 
employer."125 The test, in other words, is prospective, not retro­
spective; it judges intent, not result. This has not meant, though, 
that courts have limited themselves to a single or simple measure of 
employ~e motivation. 
116. Id. at 1167. 
117. [d. 
118. See id. 
119. 119 B.R. 350 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990), affd, 968 F.2d 1332 (1st Cir. 1992). 
120. Id. at 356-57. 
121. See id. at 371-72. 
122. Id. at 372 (quoting Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166). 
123. Id. (emphasis added). 
124. See id. at 371. 
125. Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166. 
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1. "Subjective" Motive 
Appellate courts are understandably reluctant to declare on 
their own that a given employee's motives were purely personal.126 
How can the appellate court know for sure what motivated the em­
ployee to act? A "subjective" motive test looks at motive only from 
the employee's perspective: what was the employee thinking, what 
was the employee's state of mind at the time he or she undertook 
the tortious conduct? This seems to be the inquiry Wang. asks 
courts to undertake.n7 
Courts face both the general directive not to construe "scope 
of employment" restrictively,128 and Wang's specific instruction to 
exclude from an employee's scope of employment only those acts 
whose motivations are entirely personal.129 Appellate courts that 
apply a "subjective" motive test to an employee's conduct, there­
fore, understandably find that rarely will that conduct fail that test. 
For example, the courts in Wang, Pins haw, and In re 604 Columbus 
Avenue Realty Trust all apply the "subjective" motive test, and all 
come to the conclusion that the employees' conduct in those cases 
was not driven entirely by personal motives, despite plentiful evi­
dence to the contrary .130 
Only in the extreme case of Fells Acres has an appellate court 
applying the "subjective" motive test concluded that the employees' 
purposes were wholly personal.131 In Fells Acres, day-care workers 
were accused of sexually molesting children at their school.132 It 
was so evident to the SJC that the conduct was not within the em­
ployees' Scope of employment,133 that the court hardly bothered to 
discuss what reasons the employees may have had for assaulting the 
126. See, e.g., Pinshaw v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351 (Mass. 
1988). In Pinshaw, the SJC refused to say that police officer Monk's "private counter­
attack or personal vendetta" against the plaintiff was, as a matter of law, outside the 
scope of Monk's employment. Id. at 1357 (internal quotation marks and citations omit­
ted). Summary judgment was inappropriate, the court held, because "[w]hether Monk 
acted within the scope of his official duties ... is a question of fact." Id. See supra 
notes 100-07 and accompanying text for further discussion of Monk's motives. 
127. See Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166 (defining the employee's "motive" in terms of 
his or her "purpose"). 
128. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
129. See Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166. 
130. See supra notes 97-125 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts' 
decisions regarding the employees' motives in those three cases. 
131. See Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958 (Mass. 
1990). 
132. See id. at 963. 
133. See id. at 967. 
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children. The court simply asserted that the assaults could not have 
been in response to anything the children had done, and the em­
ployees' motives for the assaults must have been completely per­
sonal and not at all "'to serve the employer."'134 
2. "Objective" Motive 
If "motive" equates to "purpose,"135 determining motive can 
be difficult, since an employee might well conceal the purpose of his 
or her conduct, especially if that purpose is at least in part personal. 
Consequently, in their efforts to determine motivation, several 
courts looked for external evidence that might signal the purposes 
for an employee's conduct.136 These courts, in other words, try to 
make Wang's "motive" test "objective." 
The Wang test asks whether the employee's conduct was "mo­
tivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer."137 
Courts using the "subjective" approach pay most of their attention 
to the employee's "purpose."138 Courts that try to make Wang's 
motive test "objective" focus to a greater extent on whether the 
employee's conduct "serv.e[d] the employer," or whether a reason­
able person in the employee's position might think that it could.139 
These courts, then, look for markers of motive, rather than at states 
of mind. 
The clearest example of this occurs in Memorial Press. In try­
ing to determine the employee's motive in that case, the court faced 
a difficult situation: the person who deliberately misprinted the po­
lice union's ad in the newspaper was n(!ver identified.140 Therefore, 
even the trial court had no choice but to deduce the employee's 
motives from the act itself. The appeals court agreed with the supe­
rior court judge's findings that "the misprint was ... contrary to the 
134. Id. (quoting Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166). 
135. Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166. 
136. See, e.g., Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1996); Kelly v. 
Middlesex Corp., 616 N.E.2d 473 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); International Bhd. of Police 
Officers, Local 433 v. Memorial Press, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). 
137. Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166 (citation omitted). 
138. [d. at 1167; see also 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust v. Capitol Bank and 
Trust Co. (In re 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust), 119 B.R. 350, 371-72 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1990), affd, 968 F.2d 1332 (1st Cir. 1992); Pinshaw v. Metropolitan Dist. 
Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351, 1357 (Mass. 1988). 
139. See, e.g., Doe, 664 N.E.2d at 820; Kelly, 616 N.E.2d at 475-76; Memorial 
Press, 575 N.E.2d at 379. 
140. See Memorial Press, 575 N.E.2d at 378. See supra note 30 and accompany­
ing text for an elaboration of the facts in Memorial Press. 
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newspaper's policies and interests."141 The court noted that" '[t]he 
fact that [the] act [was] done in an outrageous or abnormal manner 
has value in indicating that the [employee was] not actuated by an 
intent to perform the employer's business."'142 The "outrageous or 
abnormal" character of the act, together with the fact that it was 
"contrary to the newspaper's policies and interests," signaled that 
the employee's motives for the deliberate misprint must have been 
entirely personal, clearing Memorial Press of liability for the em­
ployee's conduct,143 
Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 144 was similarly decided. There, 
the store's assistant manager allegedly assaulted and raped another 
employee; obviously, this was not "the kind of action that Purity 
Supreme employed [the assistant store manager] to perform."145 
Therefore, his conduct failed Wang's "job" test. The court, how­
ever, focused most of its attention on the employee's motives, con­
cluding that "rape and sexual assault of an employee do not serve 
the interests of the employer," and for this reason the assistant 
store manager's conduct failed Wang's "motive" test,146 His ac­
tions, to use Memorial Press' language, were "outrageous" and "ab­
normal,"147 they could not have been undertaken "to serve the 
employer." His conduct thus "objectively" demonstrated that his 
motives were entirely self-serving.148 
The appeals court's analysis of motive in Kelly was also "objec­
tive."149 On a Friday morning Middlesex closed down the job site 
where Sergio Peluffo was working.150 Peluffo was told that he 
could return that afternoon to pick up his paycheck, if he wished, or 
he could collect it when he arrived at work the following Mon­
141. Memorial Press, 575 N.E.2d at 379. 
142. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 cmt. c (1958». 
143. See id. 
144. 664 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1996). 
145. Id. at 820. 
146. Id. 
147. Memorial Press, 575 N.E.2d at 379. 
148. Doe and Fells Acres are alike in that they both involved alleged sexual abuse 
by an employee. However, the court took a slightly different approach to motive in the 
two cases. In Fells Acres, a "subjective" motive case, see supra notes 131-34 and accom­
panying text, the court simply asserted that the employees' motives must have been 
completely personal. See Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 
958,967 (Mass. 1990). The court made the "motive" test "objective" in Doe by discuss­
ing the employee's motives in terms of the employer's interests. See Doe, 664 N.E.2d at 
820. The employee's motive must have been completely personal because his conduct 
ran counter to the interests of his employer. See id. 
149. Kelly v. Middlesex Corp., 616 N.E.2d 473 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). 
150. See id. at 474. 
229 1998] SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
day.151 In a pretrial deposition Peluffo acknowledged that he had 
been given this choice of times.152 He chose to pick it up that Fri­
day afternoon and was involved in an accident while driving to do 
SO.153 The court stated that "[a] jury could not reasonably conclude 
... that Middlesex instructed Peluffo to make a special trip for his 
check ...."154 The company was statutorily obligated "to make a 
paycheck available to its weekly wage earners on Friday, but it was 
not in derogation of any interest of Middlesex if a worker chose to 
pick up a check the following Monday."155 In determining whether 
Peluffo's conduct was motivated even in part "by a purpose to serve 
the employer," the Kelly court apparently did not consider what 
Peluffo himself might have thought his "purpose" was. Rather, be­
cause no "reasonable" juror (that is, no "objective" outsider) could 
conclude that Peluffo's motive was anything but personal, it was 
personal, and therefore at the time of the accident, Peluffo was not 
within the scope of his employment.156 
3. The "Job" Test as the "Motive" Test 
The "subjective" approach to motive tries to determine what 
the employee was thinking, what he or she intended.157 The "objec­
tive" approach to motive relieves courts of the haziness of "subjec­
tive" motive test in that it allows courts to look for external 
evidence of intent.158 The "objective" test, however, creates a 
problem of its own. Once motive becomes objectified, once courts 
look for markers that the employee's purpose was "to serve the em­
ployer," then Wang's "motive" test almost inevitably begins to fold 
back into the "job" test. 
Doe is the extreme example of this phenomenon. The em­
ployee in that case, who allegedly raped and sexually assaulted a 
fellow employee, "was not motivated by a purpose to serve the em­
ployer" because "rape and sexual assault of an employee do not 
serve the interests of the employer."159 This is motive looked at 
151. See id. 
152. See id. at 475. 
153. See id. at 474. 
154. [d. at 475-76. 
155. [d. at 476. 
156. See id. at 475-76. 
157. For a discussion of the "subjective" approach to motive, see supra notes 126­
34 and accompanying text. 
158. For a discussion of the "objective" approach to motive, see supra notes 135­
56 and accompanying text. 
159. Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 815, 820 (Mass. 1996). 
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"objectively." The assistant store manager's conduct, however, 
failed the "motive" test for an additional reason: the employer had 
not "'authorized or directed [his] conduct ... [and] his action was 
[not] the kind of action that [the store] employed him to per­
form."'160 Thus, in Wang's terminology, the evidence that the em­
ployee was not motivated "by a purpose to serve the employer" was 
that his conduct was not "of the kind he [was] employed to per­
form."161 The employee's conduct failed the "motive" test, it 
seems, in part because it failed the "job" test. In its application of 
the "objective" motive test, the Doe court in effect made the test 
irrelevant. Once the employee was determined not to be doing 
what he was hired to do, his motives had to have been purely 
personal.162 
A similar blending of Wang's "job" and "motive" tests oc­
curred in Memorial Press. There, the employee's deliberate mis­
print of a newspaper ad was "done in an outrageous or abnormal 
manner," "objectively" showing that the employee "was [not] moti­
vated by a desire to promote the newspaper's interests."163 As fur­
ther evidence of the personal nature of the employee's motives, the 
court observed that "the misprint was unauthorized [and] uncon­
doned ...."164 Whether an employer "authorizes" or "condones" 
the employee's actiop.s, however, indicates much more about 
whether the employee is doing what he or she was employed to 
do-Wang's "job" test-than about his or her motives 'for doing it. 
The SJC's analysis of motive in Pinshaw was primarily "subjec­
tive,"165 but not exclusively so. The court, looking at motive from 
the employee's perspective, felt that Officer Monk may have "be­
lieved he was serving his employer"166 when he undertook his" 'pri­
vate counter-attack or personal vendetta' against the plaintiff 
.."167 Furthermore, the court found "objective;' evidence that 
160. Id. (quoting the superior court judge's decision). 
161. Wang Lab., Inc. 'v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (Mass. 
1986) (citations omitted). 
162. This is not to suggest that Doe was wrongly decided; far from it. Who would 
argue that sexual assault and rape should be within any employee's scope of employ­
ment? It is only to suggest that in reaching the right outcome, the Doe court dimin­
ished the value of the Wang test, which the Doe court claimed to be applying. 
163. International Bhd. of Police Officers, Local 433 v. Memorial Press, Inc., 575 
N.E.2d 376, 379 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). 
164. Id. 
165. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of "subjec­
tive" motive in Pinshaw. . 
166. Pinshaw v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351, 1357 (Mass. 1988). 
167. Id. 1357 (quoting superior court judge's decision). 
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Monk's conduct may have served his employer's purposes, in that 
the MDC "knew of [his] retaliatory action ... [and] may have en­
dorsed or ratified [it]."168 Yet this observation says much less about 
Monk's intentions than about his superiors'. The "endorsed or rati­
fied" wording in Pinshaw is remarkably close to the language that 
the Wang court employed to explain how it knew that Wang's em­
ployee was doing the kind of work he was employed to perform 
when his efforts led Wang to violate its contract with an outside tax 
consultant,169 This must have been "the kind of conduct [the em­
ployee] was [hired] to perform," the court said, in part because it 
was "repeatedly endorsed and utilized by Wang's executives."17o 
Even the SJC's refusal in Fells Acres to elaborate on its asser­
tion that the day-care workers' motives for allegedly molesting chil­
drenat the school were wholly personal,l71 can be read as the 
court's disinclination to maintain a clear separation between the 
"job" and the "motive" parts of the Wang test. In Fells Acres, the 
court seems to be saying that, since the assaults were so clearly not 
the kind of acts these employees were hired to perform, they could 
not have been motivated, even in part, "'by a purpose to serve the 
employ~r."'l72 In this context, at least, the evidence for, and the 
analysis of, Wang's "motive" test is identical to that for the "job" 
test,173 . 
168. [d. . 
169. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 
(Mass. 1986). 
170. [d. (emphasis added). Kelly cites Pinshaw for the proposition that an em­
ployee's motives are purely personal if his or her conduct is "unconnected in any way 
with the employer's interests ...." Kelly v. Middlesex Corp., 616 N.E.2d 473, 474 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993). This is not really a fair summary of the Pinshaw court's discus­
. sion of the "motive" test. What it captures, however, is the way in which Pinshaw blurs 
the line between the "motive" and the "job" tests. Conduct which is unconnected with 
the employer's interests is conduct no employee is hired to perform, regardless of his or 
her motives for performing it. 
17l. See Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958 (Mass. 
1990). See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wang's "mo­
tive" test as applied in Fells Acres. 
172. Fells Acres, 558 N.E.2d at 967 (citation omitted). 
173. Another case that can be read this way is Burroughs v. Commonwealth, 673 
N.E.2d 1217, 1219 (Mass. 1996). There, an off-duty National Guardsman, Michael Mor­
gante, served a fellow Guardsman, Robert LaCasse, some drinks. See id. at 1218. La­
Casse was then involved in a motor vehicle accident while under the influence of the 
alcohol. See id. The SJC concluded that because Morgante had not been paid or re­
quested by his superiors to bartend, his conduct was not '''of the kind he [was] em­
ployed to perform'" and that it was not '''motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to 
serve the [Commonwealth).'" [d. at 1219 (quoting Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166). The 
measure for part three of the Wang test was no different from the measure for part one. 
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As discussed above, courts often have trouble keeping separate 
the "job" and the "time and space" elements of Wang's scope of 
employment test.174 Occasionally they have the same trouble sepa­
rating the "job" and "motive" elements.175 This is especially true 
for those courts tempted by the beguiling but oxymoronic mirage of 
"objective" motives. For if there are external indicators of an em­
ployee's desire to further the purposes of his or her employer, what 
can they be other than that the employee is trying to do whatever 
he or she was employed to perform? 
II. CLICKNER V. CITY OF LOWELL AND BEYOND 
In April of 1996, the SIC decided Clickner v. City of Lowell.176 
This decision signaled that the SIC would no longer be bound by 
Wang's, approach to scope of employment analysis.177 Though 
nominally relying on Wang in its decision,178 the Clickner court 
turned away from Wang's division of scope of employment into 
three distinct and apparently exhaustive categoriesP9 Unlike pre­
vious courts, the SIC in Clickner did not find that Wang circum­
scribed the boundaries of scope of employment analysis; instead, 
the three-part Wang test merely enumerated some of the "[f]actors 
to be considered" in determining whether an employee's acts fell 
within his or her scope of employment.18o Since the Clickner deci­
sion, Wang has not completely relinquished its hold on scope of 
employment jurisprudence;181 on the other hand, neither does it to­
tally control the field as it did before Clickner.182 
174. See supra Part I.B. 
175. See supra notes 157-73 and accompanying text. 
176. 663 N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1996). 
177. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163 (Mass. 
1986). 
178. See Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855. 
179. See Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166. 
180. Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855 (citing Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166). 
181. See, e.g., Burroughs v. Commonwealth, 673 N.E.2d 1217, 1219 (Mass. 1996), 
(ignoring Clickner and relying entirely on Wang; asserting that Wang "set forth the 
factors relevant to scope of employment determinations"); see also Doe v. Purity 
Supreme, 664 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1996). Doe is another post-Clickner case that relies 
entirely on Wang and makes no mention of Clickner. This may be so because Clickner 
and Doe were decided so close together in time-the former in April, the latter in 
May-that by the time Doe was decided, Clickner had not yet registered as relevant 
precedent; neither side in Doe could have known about or relied on Clickner in its 
arguments. 
182. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Lamy, 938 F. Supp. 1018, 1045 (D. Mass. 1996), (ap­
plying Massachusetts scope of employment law and relying primarily on Clickner, not 
Wang). 
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A. The Clickner Case 
Francis M. Waterman, a Lowell policeman, was driving to work 
when he crossed "the center line of the road and collided with the 
motor vehicle in which the Clickners were riding," injuring them.183 
The accident occurred in the town of Groton, at about 4:50 in the 
afternoon.184 Waterman was trying to get to his five-o'clock shift in 
Lowell after spending the day in Groton playing golf and drink­
ing.185 The car he was in belonged to the Lowell Police Depart­
ment, which had allowed Waterman to drive it to his golf 
tournament so that he could "report for his shift or . . . respond 
immediately to any emergency calls without returning home."I86 
He had crossed the center line while attempting to use the cellular 
phone in the car to respond to a page from the Lowell police sta­
tion.187 Waterman was later "found guilty of operating [a motor 
vehicle] while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and failure 
to yield. "188 
At trial, the superior court judge ruled that Lowell was not lia­
ble for Waterman's conduct because he was not acting within the 
scope of his employment.189 When Waterman appealed, the SJC 
affirmed the trial court's ruling.190 
The SJC began its discussion of scope of employment law with 
the well-established basics-that "'[t]he scope of an employee's 
employment is not construed restrictively,"'191 and that Wang had 
set down a three-part test for determining whether an employee's 
conduct was within his or her scope of employment. l92 What the 
Clickner facts showed the court was that, in effect, Officer Water­
man's actions failed at least the first two parts of the test.193 He was 
in Groton, not Lowell, which meant he was not "in a place helpful 
183. Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 854. 
184. See id. 
185. See id. 
186. [d. 
187. See id. 
188. [d. 
189. See id. 
190. See id. 
191. [d. at 855 (quoting Howard v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 102, 105 
(Mass. 1987) and citing Commonwealth v. Jerez, 457 N.E.2d 1105 (Mass. 1983». 
192. See id. In the court's view, however, the Wang test was not exhaustive. It 
was, rather, among the "[f]actors to be considered" in determining whether an em­
ployee acted within the scope of his or her employment. [d. 
193. See id. at 855 n.5. Because the Clickner court did not rely solely on the 
Wang test in deciding that Officer Waterman's conduct was not within his scope of 
employment, it is unclear to what degree Wang's approach to scope of employment 
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to his employer,"194 and "his shift had not yet begun."195 Thus, Wa­
terman's conduct implicitly failed Wang's "time and space" test.196 
In addition, although Waterman was in a city-owned vehicle at the 
time of the accident, he "was not being paid at that time[,] ... he 
was intoxicated and unfit for duty[,] ... [and he] was not acting in 
the furtherance of the employer's business ...."197 "[T]he mere 
fact of being on call, [which Waterman was]," the court maintained, 
"does not place employees within the scope of their employ­
ment."198 Thus, Waterman's conduct implicitly failed Wang's "job" 
test as well.199 The SJC did not apply the "motive" part of Wang's 
test.2oo The court said, however, that "Waterman's actions through­
out the day of the accident were in the furtherance of his own 
agenda. "201 
The only difficult question the court faced was "whether [Wa­
terman's] act of responding to the page was enough to tip the bal­
ance and to bring his conduct within the scope of [his] employment 
...."202 That conduct did not "tip the balance," the SJC decided, 
agreeing with the trial court's ruling that '''[t]he mere fact that just 
prior to [the accident] Waterman was attempting to contact his 
subordinate by cellular telephone in response to her page does not 
work an electronic alchemy and transmute his entire course of con­
duct into the kind of work which he was employed to perform."'203 
Therefore, Waterman's conduct was not within the scope of his em­
ployment, and Lowell was not liable for the. injuries he caused the 
Clickners.204 
analysis. shaped or governed the court's thinking in Clickner. See infra Part II.C. for 
further discussion of this point. 
194. Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855. 
195. Id. 
196. See id. at 855 n.5. 
197. Id. .at 855. 
198. Id. (citations omitted). 
199. See id. at 855 n.5. 
200. The court noted the potential applicability of Wang's "motive" test, but then 
observed that Clickner is different from Wang in that "in the present case .... the em­
ployee was not acting within the authorized limits of time and space and ... his conduct 
was not clearly that which he was hired to perform." Id. This comment suggests that 
the court felt it was unnecessary to analyze Waterman's motives. His conduct was not 
within his scope of employment, regardless of his motives. 
201. Id. at 856. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. (alterations in the original) (quoting the superior court judge's decision). 
204. See id. at 854, 856. 
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B. The Clickner Decision 
The result reached by the SJC in Clickner seems wrong for two 
reasons. First, the court found Waterman's drunkenness to be a­
perhaps the-significant factor in determining that his conduct 
failed Wang's "job" test. Waterman, the SJC observed, was "intoxi­
cated and unfit for duty" at the time of the accident.205 Later the 
court returned to the issue of Waterman's inebriated state: "He had 
... consumed an amount of beer sufficient to render him intoxi­
cated.... [H]e was not permitted to perform his job while intoxi­
cated, and ... he was not fit for duty at the time of the accident. "206 
Yet what employee is ever "permitted to perform his job while in­
toxicated"? What employee is ever "fit for duty" when drunk? In­
ebriation is not part of anyone's job description; that fact alone, 
however, should not eliminate the employer's liability for an inebri­
ated employee's conduct. Intoxication frequently figures in scope 
of employment cases, but courts do not generally find it determina­
tive.207 The question should not be whether the employee was 
drunk; the question should be what did the employee do while 
drunk? That Officer Waterman was intoxicated is a fact, but it 
should not dispose of the question-one way or the other-as to 
whether when his car ran into the Clickners' he was doing his job as 
a Lowell policeman. . 
The second reason the SJC erred in deciding that Waterman's 
conduct was not within his scope of employment relates to the 
emergency call he received. The court maintained, fairly enough, 
that merely being "on call" did not automatically put Waterman (or 
any other employee) within the scope of his employment.20g The 
court went further, however, and ruled that Waterman's attempt to 
respond to the page from the Lowell police department did not 
"'work an electronic alchemy and transmute his entire course of 
conduct into the kind of work which he was employed to per­
form."'209 This ruling was crucial, because it was just at the moment 
that Waterman was trying·to answer the page on his cellular phone 
that he swerved across the center line and into the vehicle in which 
the Clickners were riding.2lO 
The Clickner court expressed concern that "an overbroad in­
. . 
205. See id. at 855. 
206. Id. at 856. . 
207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228-30, 233, 236-37 (1958). 
208. See Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855. . 
209. Id. at 856 (quoting the superior court judge's decision). 
210. See id. at 854. 
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terpretation" of scope of employment would "create unreasonable 
liability for municipalities."211 Perhaps for that reason the SJC nar­
rowly restricted Waterman's scope of employment to the city of 
Lowell, during his assigned shift.212 The police department, how­
ever, had permitted Waterman to drive one of its cars, with its cellu­
lar phone, to his golf tournament so that he could "respond 
immediately to any emergency calls . . . . "213 He had, in other 
words, been directed to take such calls, presumably regardless of 
whether he was in Lowell or whether it was after his shift's starting 
time of 5:00 p.m. If the employer directs the employee to under­
take some course of action or if the employer "endorse[s] and util­
ize[s]" the employee's conduct, Wang says, those actions fall within 
the employee's scope of employment.214 In this electronic age "al­
chemical" reactions such as occurred in Clickner are commonplace. 
The instant the police department paged Waterman, it asked him to 
begin to do the kind of work he was "employed to. perform," at a 
time and in a place where he had been "authorized" to act. Thus, at 
that moment Waterman's conduct entered within the scope of his 
employment.215 
C. Clickner's Analysis Versus Wang's 
The outcome in Clickner appears to limit employer liability in 
scope of employment cases more than the Wang court intended. 
First, the SJC said in Clickner that the employee, the police officer 
Waterman, was not within his scope of employment because "his 
conduct was not clearly that which he was hired to perform."216 
This use of the word clearly suggests a retreat from the broad inter­
pretation of scope of employment found in Wang and its prog­
eny.217 It also contradicts the court's assertion that "'[t]he scope of 
211. Id. at 854-55. 
212. See id. at 855. 
213. Id. at 854. 
214. Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (Mass. 
1986); see also Pinshaw v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351, 1357 (Mass. 
1988) (finding that police officer's superiors who knew about his tortious conduct may 
have "endorsed or ratified [his] action"). 
215. See Wang, 501 N.E.2d at 1166. 
216. Id. at 855 n.5 (emphasis added). 
217. See, e.g., Pinshaw v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 524 N.E.2d 1351 (Mass. 
1988); Howard v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 102 (Mass. 1987); International Bhd. 
of Police Officers, Local 433 v. Memorial Press, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1991). 
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an employee's employment is not construed restrictively.'''218 
Clickner effectively reverses that presumption. Taken at face value, 
Clickner shifts the burden of proof regarding whether an em­
ployee's conduct is within his or her scope of employment in a way 
beneficial to employers.219 Scope of employment cases-especially 
those that reach appellate courts-must often arise at the margin 
between "scope" and "not scope." Clickner encourages future 
courts to pull those margins in toward the certain center. 
Second, the Clickner court did not find the Wang test for scope 
of employment exhaustive, as had previous courts.220 Rather, it 
listed Wang's three-part test as among the "[f]actors to be consid­
ered."221 The court never set forth, however, what "factors" it be­
lieved relevant to scope of employment that do not fit into one of 
the Wang test's three categories. Officer Waterman's inebriation 
appears to be the only possible such factor. It made him, the court 
said, "unfit for duty."222 Yet Waterman's drunkenness-to the ex­
tent that it should even have been considered223-only made it so 
that he could not do his job properly.224 That is, Waterman was 
unable to undertake the kind of work he was employed to perform. 
Being "unfit for duty," in other words, is really no different from an 
inability to pass Wang's "job" test.225 
218. Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855 (quoting Howard, 506 N.E.2d at 105 (citing 
Commonwealth v. Jerez, 457 N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (Mass. 1983))). 
219. Cj. Howard, 506 N.E.2d at 105 (finding that taxpayers who filed a lawsuit to 
prevent Burlington from indemnifying the town's finance committee chairwoman in a 
defamation action brought against her "had the burden of proof on the issue" of 
whether her conduct was within the scope of her employment). 
220. With the possible exception of Kelly v. Middlesex Corp., 616 N.E.2d 473 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993), no pre-Clickner case that employed the Wang three-part test for 
scope of employment analyzed the employee's conduct except in terms of that test. In 
Kelly, too, the appeals court put the employee's conduct under the Wang microscope. 
Then, however, the court mentioned "certain additional factors" it found relevant in 
determining that the employee-apparently a construction worker, who was involved in 
an automobile accident while voluntarily returning to his closed-down job site to pick 
up his paycheck-was not within the scope of his employment. [d. at 476. Among 
these "additional factors" were that the employee was "off duty," that "he was not on 
call," and that his "conduct at the time of the accident was independent of the require­
ments or interests of his employer ...." /d. These "additional factors" are, of course, 
not additional at all, but are exactly the kinds of factors that can easily be fit into the 
Wang test categories. 
221. Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855. 
222. [d. 
223. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ques­
tionable relevance of Officer Waterman's inebriation. 
224. See Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 856. 
225. See Wang Lab., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1166 
(Mass. 1986). 
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Third, the Clickner court converted Wang's relatively clear "el­
ements" test into a vague "balancing" test.226 In Clickner, the SJC 
set forth the factors that suggested Waterman was within his scope 
of employment and weighed them against those that suggested he 
was not.227 The court specifically asked whether Waterman's "act 
of responding to the page [from the Lowell police] was enough to 
tip the balance and to bring his conduct within the scope of employ­
ment. . . . "228 Balancing tests are often imprecise; when courts 
weigh factors, both the choice of factors to be weighed and the 
weight each is assigned can become subjective. Thus, the outcome 
of lawsuits in areas of law governed by balancing tests can be un­
predictable. Wang's three-part test for scope of employment, 
though not without its problems,229 at least provides potential liti­
gants with a clearer sense of how that issue will be analyzed by the 
courts than does Clickner's "balancing test" approach. 
D. The Post-Clickner Future 
The future of scope of employment jurisprudence in Massachu­
setts remains uncertain. Appellate courts have had only a few occa­
sions on which to address scope of employment questions since the 
SJC's decision in Clickner. In the first post-Clickner case, Doe v. 
Purity Supreme, Inc.,239 the SJC ignored Clickner, which had been 
handed down barely a week earlier,231 and looked at the scope of 
employment question through the Wang lens.232 The court in 
Timpson v. Transamerica Insurance Company,233 a case decided six 
months ~fter Clickner, performed the sa1?e analysis. There, the 
court discussed the Wang test extensively, but never even men­
tioned Clickner.234 
Only in Armstrong v. Lamy,235 a federal district court case ap­
plying Massachusetts scope of employment law, did a court seem­
226. Clickner, 663 N.E.2d at 855-56. 
227. See id. 
228. Id. at 856 (emphasis added). The court determined, of course, that it was 
not, since Waterman's drunkenness clearly "tipped the balance" in the other direction. 
Id. 
229. See supra Parts LB. and LC.3. 
230. 664 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1996). 
231. Clickner was decided on April 25, 1996; Doe on May 3, 1996. 
232. See Doe, 664 N.E.2d at 820. 
233. 669 N.E.2d 1092 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). 
234. See id. at 1095-96. 
235. 938 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Mass. 1996). 
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ingly rely on Clickner, rather than Wang, as its primary authority.236 
The district court may have done this because it. thought that 
Clickner's balancing-test approach now governs scope of employ­
ment law in Massachusetts. It is far more likely, however, that the 
Armstrong court relied on Clickner because both cases arose in the 
context of public-employer liability for public-employee misconduct 
under the Massachusetts Torts Claims Act.237 Indeed, the test the 
Armstrong court then used to determine if the employee's conduct 
was within his scope of employment was the Wang test, as quoted in 
Clickner.238 In Burroughs v. Commonwealth,239 the SJC itself once 
again found the relevant scope of employment formulation in 
Wang, not Clickner.24o The Burroughs court also cited Kansallis 
Finance Ltd. v. Fern241-a case involving a phiintiff's reliance on the 
apparent authority of a partner in a partnership-for the proposi­
tion that "'[t]he scope of employment test asks the question: is this 
the kind of thing that in a general way employees of this kind do in 
employment of this kind."'242 By approving the "in a general way" 
approach to scope of employment, the Burroughs court seemed to 
be returning to the nonrestrictive construction of scope of employ­
ment articulated in Commonwealth v. Jerez ,243 and acknowledged 
by the SJC in subsequent cases,244 but that had been implicitly re­
jected in Clickner.245 
If these recent cases are any indication, the Clickner decision is 
something of an aberration. So far, fortunately, it has had slight 
impact on how courts approach scope of employment questions. 
Courts have declined to accept-and may not even have recog­
nized-Clickner's invitation to reconfigure scope of employment 
236. See id. at 1045. The court noted, however, that Clickner itself relied on 
Wang's three-part test to provide "factors to be considered" in the scope of employ­
ment analysis. Id. 
237. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (1994); see also Armstrong, 938 F. Supp. at 
1045 ("[In Clickner], [t]he Supreme Judicial Court ... had occasion to consider the 
meaning of the phrase 'acting within the scope of his office or employment,' as that 
phrase is used in § 2 of the MTCA.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Clickner v. 
City of Lowell, 663 N.E.2d 852, 854 (Mass. 1996). 
238. See Armstrong, 938 F. Supp. at 1045. 
239. 673 N.E.2d 1217 (Mass. 1996). 
240. See id. at 1219 ("[Wang] set[s] forth the factors relevant to scope of employ­
ment determinations ....") (emphasis added). 
241. 659 N.E.2d 731 (Mass. 1996). 
242. Burroughs, 673 N.E.2d at 1219 (quoting Kansallis, 659 N.E.2d at 735). 
243. 457 N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (Mass. 1983). 
244. See, e.g., Howard v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Mass. 1987). 
245. 663 N.E.2d 852, 855 (Mass. 1996) (court quotes Howard favorably but de­
fines scope of employment restrictively). 
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analysis. Wang still delineates scope of employment law in Massa­
chusetts. Clickner, with its questionable outcome and opaque bal­
ancing test, provides a far less reliable precedent than do Wang and 
its progeny. Clickner makes results-driven analysis too easy and 
too tempting. If the Clickner approach prevails, a court would be 
free to select whatever factors it wanted to consider, and to balance 
those factors as it chose, in deciding whether an employee's conduct 
fell within his or her scope of employment. On the other hand, 
Wang's three-part test, however imperfect, is exhaustive; it gives 
courts and litigants clear ground rules for determining the bounda­
ries of an employee's scope of employment. In the final analysis 
this is fairer to all than the most careful balancing of an ever chang­
ing set of scope of employment "factors." 
